This Business of  Procuring Cause  in Virginia by Luther, Robert, III
William & Mary Business Law Review
Volume 3 | Issue 1 Article 5
This Business of "Procuring Cause" in Virginia
Robert Luther III
Copyright c 2012 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr
Repository Citation
Robert Luther III, This Business of "Procuring Cause" in Virginia, 3 Wm. & Mary Bus. L. Rev. 181
(2012), https://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmblr/vol3/iss1/5
 181 
THIS BUSINESS OF “PROCURING CAUSE” IN VIRGINIA 
ROBERT LUTHER III
*
 
ABSTRACT 
This Article aims to provide a basic overview of Virginia law resulting 
from suits for sales commissions, with a special emphasis on “procuring 
cause” case law. By thinking ahead to the kinds of issues that have re-
sulted in the recovery or failure of sales commissions by agents in past 
sales commission cases, real estate litigators will be in a better position to 
advise their clients. To that end, this Article further seeks to serve as a 
brief, yet stout, reference resource for real estate litigators and members 
of the Virginia bench confronted with facts directed towards this often 
nuanced area of Virginia law. 
                                                 
* Mr. Luther’s practice is based in Williamsburg, Virginia, and emphasizes business, 
civil, real estate, and constitutional litigation. Please note that the opinions expressed in 
this Article are exclusively those of the author and do not constitute legal advice, nor 
does the receipt or review of the information contained herein establish an attorney-client 
relationship. Comments are graciously received at http://www.RobLuther.com. 
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INTRODUCTION 
It has long been the practice in the United States for judges to decide 
questions of law and juries to decide questions of fact.
1
 Put simply, whe-
reas “[i]t is the duty of the court to construe a deed, or contract,”
2
 it is the 
duty of juries to consider testimony and determine factual matters such as 
whether “the light was green” when the two cars collided.
3
 Unfortunately, 
the reality is that trial court practice is often not particularly tidy; most 
cases involve mixed questions of law and fact. Legendary evidence Pro-
fessor James Bradley Thayer has even gone so far as to say that “[a]ll 
questions of fact ... are mixed questions of law and fact.”
4
 Given these 
semantics, perhaps distinction by analogy is helpful here. It has been sug-
gested in modern legal scholarship that, “the most frequently given exam-
ple of a mixed question of law and fact is the question of whether a person 
is ‘negligent.’”
5
 Although “negligence” is a word of common definition, in 
the law it has a specific definition realized upon the application of facts as 
found by a jury to the legal standard of duty, breach, causation and dam-
ages.
6
 
Akin to negligence, Virginia law has its own specific definition for the 
occasion when an agent
7
 is entitled to a commission for his or her market-
                                                 
1 George C. Christie, Judicial Review of Findings of Fact, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 14, 14 
(1992). 
2 Realty Co. of Va. v. Burcum, 106 S.E. 375, 376 (Va. 1921) (asserting that it is the 
role of the Court and not the jury to decide questions of law, which include “the legal 
effect of a deed or contract”). 
3 See generally id. 
4 JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE 
COMMON LAW 224–25 (Rothman Reprints, Inc. 1969). 
5 Christie, supra note 1, at 14. 
6 See 13 PETER NASH SWISHER, ROBERT E. DRAIM & DAVID D. HUDGINS, VIRGINIA 
PRACTICE SERIES: TORT AND PERSONAL INJURY LAW § 3:1 n.25 (Thomson Reuters/West, 
2011 ed.) (citing WILLIAM LLOYD PROSSER & W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON 
ON TORTS 164–68 (West 5th ed. 1984) and DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 269–73 
(West 2000)); see also McGuire v. Hodges, 639 S.E.2d 284, 288 (Va. 2007) (“To estab-
lish negligence sufficient to sustain a judgment against Mrs. Hodges, McGuire was 
required ‘to show the existence of a legal duty, a breach of the duty, and proximate causa-
tion resulting in damage.’”) (citations omitted). 
7 The cases have not spilt much ink distinguishing between agents, brokers, and real-
tors in the context of commission litigation. That said, as a general proposition, any of 
these three classes of individuals who are authorized to and enter an agency relationship 
to facilitate the sale of real estate would seem to have these cases at his or her disposal, 
subject to express prohibitions to the contrary, ethics codes (where applicable), and 
defenses raised by counsel in litigation suggesting reasons why they should not apply. 
Most frequently, cases involve an individual seeking to recover a commission from a 
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ing efforts. That phrase is “procuring cause.”
8
 Like “negligence,” the 
“procuring cause” of a real estate transaction has typically been deter-
mined at trial by a jury’s application of facts to the legal standard in-
structed, unless the parties agree otherwise.
9
 Yet there is some question as 
to whether these “procuring cause” cases have produced a unified body of 
law. The Supreme Court of Virginia has paid special note to this difficulty 
and suggested that: 
It is impossible to reconcile either the expressions of the courts or the 
various cases involving the commissions of real estate brokers, and it 
would be a thankless and unprofitable task to review [even] a limited 
number of the cases. There are, however, certain fundamental rules 
which are everywhere recognized, even if it may appear that they have 
not always been observed.10 
This Article accepts the Leicht-Benson Realty court’s outstanding invi-
tation for clarification, and aims to provide a basic overview of those 
“fundamental rules which are everywhere recognized,”
11
 and which com-
prise the basics of Virginia’s body of “procuring cause” case law. By 
thinking ahead to the kinds of issues that have resulted in the recovery or 
failure of sales commissions by agents in past sales commission cases, real 
estate litigators will be in better positions to advise their clients. To that 
end, this Article further seeks to serve as a brief, yet stout, reference re-
source for real estate litigators and members of the Virginia bench con-
fronted with facts directed towards this often nuanced area of Virginia 
law. 
                                                                                                                         
successful seller. Less frequently, cases involve real estate entities seeking to recover 
commissions believed to be owed by successful sellers or purchasers for the listing enti-
ties’ role in the resulting sale. See, e.g., Edmonds v. Coldwell Banker, 377 S.E.2d 443, 
445 (Va. 1989); R.A. Poff & Co. v. Ottaway, 62 S.E.2d 865, 866 (Va. 1951); Wilson v. 
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 738 (Va. 1945); Realty Co. of Va. v. Burcum, 
106 S.E. 375, 376 (Va. 1921). 
8 Edmonds, 377 S.E.2d at 445. 
9 See, e.g., Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 261 (Va. 1948); Edwards v. Cragg, 50 
S.E.2d 281, 281 (Va. 1948); Richeson v. Wilson, 47 S.E.2d 393, 394 (Va. 1948); Long v. 
Flory & Garber, 72 S.E. 723, 723 (Va. 1911) (cases where parties agreed to try commis-
sion cases by judge alone). 
10 Leicht-Benson Realty & Constr. Corp. v. J. D. Stone & Co., 121 S.E. 883, 884 (Va. 
1924). 
11 Id. 
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I. THE NATURE OF A LISTING AGREEMENT IN MODERN REAL ESTATE 
PRACTICE 
Real estate listing agreements are not entirely unlike standard form 
contracts; consequently, the requirements for valid enforcement are simi-
lar.
12
 Though Virginia realtors in 2012 primarily use the Virginia Associa-
tion of Realtors Exclusive Authorization to Sell (closed listing) form when 
engaging a hopeful seller, nothing precludes a court from enforcing or 
declining to enforce unique listing agreements prepared by realtors on 
case-by-case bases, presuming they comply with standard contract law 
requirements and are otherwise duly executed.
13
 
Assuming the listing agreement is duly executed, and litigation subse-
quently commences, a court charged with reviewing the listing agreement 
will start its analysis the same way it would consider any other contract: 
by first asking whether it is enforceable as it is written within its four cor-
ners.
14
 In Virginia, listing agreements are most likely to be unenforceable 
when: (1) they contain no termination language, and (2) a sale is consum-
mated after the ninety-day window from the date on which the realtor’s 
services were secured.
15
 This is the case because the Virginia Code (the 
Code) requires that such agreements include a date
16
 or event
17
 upon 
                                                 
12 See generally Price v. Francis, 35 S.E.2d 823, 825–26 (Va. 1945). 
13 Obviously, when circumstances arise where it is appropriate for a realtor to go 
beyond the Virginia Association of Realtors Exclusive Authorization to Sell (closed 
listing) form and prepare a unique listing agreement, the prudent course for both the 
realtor and hopeful seller would be to have counsel review the form of listing agreement 
prior to its execution. 
14 See Price, 35 S.E.2d at 825. 
15 See Bryant Real Estate, Inc. v. Toll Brothers, Inc., 106 F. App’x. 182, 185 (4th Cir. 
2004) (applying the Virginia Code Section 54.1-2137(B) in a situation where broker-
plaintiffs failed to discuss or memorialize in the form of agreement any language con-
cerning a termination date whereby their brokerage services to Toll would terminate). 
16 See VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2137(B) (2011) (“Brokerage agreements shall be in 
writing and shall: 1. Have a definite termination date; however, if a brokerage relation-
ship does not specify a definite termination date, the brokerage relationship shall termi-
nate 90 days after the date of the brokerage agreement”). 
17 See Piedmont Assoc., Inc. v. Little, 49 Va. Cir. 488, 490 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1999) (reject-
ing the argument that a specifically fixed “date” was necessary). In Piedmont, the court 
concluded that the statute meant that a definitive “event” upon which termination would 
occur satisfied the statutory requirement of a definite termination date. Id. It said: 
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which the agreement is set to terminate. It is uncomfortably easy to see 
how this situation may arise, because an agent may quite reasonably con-
tinue to market an unsold property beyond the explicit three-month win-
dow of protection provided under the Code.
18
 Absent a contract to the 
contrary, if successful in securing a sale but denied a commission by the 
seller, the agent will be left only with a remedy in quantum meruit.
19
 
II. WHEN IS A COMMISSION DUE? 
In Virginia, an agent is due a commission “when he produces a pur-
chaser ready, willing and able to buy on the terms authorized by or accept-
                                                                                                                         
The Court having examined the structure of §54.1-2137 is convinced 
that the legislature did not intend or mean this statute to require that 
every brokerage contract have a date certain (i.e., a month, day, and 
year) on which it terminates but that a brokerage contract needs to have 
only a stated date or the occurrence of a specified event from which a 
fact finder can reasonably determine if contractual obligations have 
been timely fulfilled. 
Id. The court further noted that, “[b]y that language, the legislature clearly appears to 
have contemplated that parties can enter into brokerage contracts which have as their 
termination point the occurrence of a certain event or events.” Id. 
18 However, a listing agreement that defines its term as “month-to-month” should not 
be held unenforceable for lack of a definite termination date. The meaning of the term 
“month” is definite as a matter of law, and is not cause for a court to render said agree-
ment unenforceable. The Virginia Code specifically defines “month” to be “a calendar 
month.” VA. CODE ANN. § 1-223 (2008). Moreover, the frequent use of “month-to-
month” terminology in landlord-tenant, employment, and other commercial endeavors 
makes clear that “month” is a calendar month, subject to termination in the event the 
property is sold or upon notice by the other party. See, e.g., Sentara Enters., Inc. v. CCP 
Assocs., 413 S.E.2d 595, 596 (Va. 1992) (landlord-tenant); Title Ins. Co. of Richmond v. 
Howell, 164 S.E. 387, 389 (Va. 1932) (employment); SoftPros, Inc. v. Privacy Vaults 
Online, Inc., 78 Va. Cir. 323, 326 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009) (software services contract); see 
also VA. CODE ANN. §§ 55-223, 55-248.7 (2007) (month-to-month). 
19 See Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 869 (Va. 1950); Va. Bus. Exch., Inc. v. Ma-
thews, 38 Va. Cir. 370, 371 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1996) (“With regard to whether plaintiff was the 
procuring cause of the sale, plaintiff relies on well-settled Virginia law that even in the 
absence of an express contract, where a broker ‘perform[s] services which [are] the 
procuring cause of the sale and under such circumstances as to give the owner reason to 
believe they [are] performed with the expectation of compensation,’ the broker may 
recover a reasonable commission under the doctrine of implied contract.”) (citing Kor-
zendorfer Realty v. Hawkes, 178 S.E.2d 524, 526 (Va. 1971)); see also Wilson v. 
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 742 (Va. 1945) (“Of course, the broker’s right to 
commissions must be based on a valid contract, express or implied”); Shea Realty Corp. 
v. Page, 69 S.E. 327, 328 (Va. 1910) (all cases recognizing an implied contract to pay 
commission if broker is determined to be the “procuring cause” of sale). 
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able to the seller.”
20
 Naturally, the follow-up question asks whether the 
contract must close as a prerequisite for the agent’s entitlement to a com-
mission. The Supreme Court of Virginia considered this question in Kuga 
v. Chang.
21
 In Kuga, Chang was a broker acting on behalf of the Kugas.
22
 
The listing agreement entitled Chang to a six percent commission.
23
 
Chang procured the signature of Rainwater on a contract for the purchase 
of the Kugas’ home.
24
 Rainwater backed out of closing, and a number of 
suits against the parties ensued, including a suit by Chang against the 
Kugas for her commission under the listing agreement as modified by the 
sales contract.
25
 The circuit court ruled for Chang and the Supreme Court 
of Virginia affirmed.
26
 The court held that a broker is entitled to a com-
mission from the owner when the broker produces a purchaser ready, 
willing, and able to buy the property on the owner’s terms, regardless of 
whether the sale is ultimately consummated.
27
 
So when, as a matter of law, is a prospective purchaser “ready, willing 
and able to buy the property?”
28
 Virginia law requires neither that an agent 
generate a contract of sale,
29
 nor that the sale be otherwise consum-
mated,
30
 unless a specific condition precedent in the contract between the 
                                                 
20 See VA. MODEL JURY INSTRUCTIONS—CIVIL, Jury Instr. No. 43.000 (Repl. Vol. 
2011) [hereinafter JURY INSTRUCTIONS]. 
21 Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 817 (Va. 1991). 
22 Id. 
23 Id. 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at 818. 
26 Id. at 819. 
27 See Kuga, 399 S.E.2d at 819; see also Kingsland Land Corp. v. Lange, 160 S.E.2d 
872, 874 (Va. 1950) (announcing, for the first time in Virginia, the rule that the “right to 
a commission will not be defeated by the failure or financial inability of the purchaser to 
perform.”). 
28 See JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, No. 43.050 (“A purchaser is ready, willing 
and able to buy if he wants to buy and if at the time he is produced to the seller he has the 
ability to obtain any necessary financing at the closing”). 
29 See, e.g., Richeson v. Wilson, 47 S.E.2d 393, 396 (Va. 1948) (“[U]nless his agree-
ment with the owner so provides, the broker is not required to procure a written contract 
signed by the purchaser as a condition precedent to his right to recover commissions.”); 
Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 263 (Va. 1948) (same); Low Moor Iron Co. of Va. v. 
Jackson, 84 S.E. 100, 102–03 (Va. 1915) (affirming jury verdict for broker and holding 
that, unless stated otherwise, a broker is not required to procure a written contract signed 
by purchaser as condition precedent for right to recover commission for producing ready, 
willing, and able buyer). 
30 See, e.g., Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263 (stating that a broker’s right to recover commis-
sion is not dependent upon consummation of sale); Massie v. Firmstone, 114 S.E. 652, 
653 (Va. 1922) (same). 
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broker and seller calls for as much.
31
 As described supra,
32
 the law of 
“procuring cause” with respect to broker commissions in Virginia has 
never been, and is not now, that formalistic or narrow.
33
 However, simply 
because an agent need not produce a contract of sale to be entitled to a 
commission, this is not to say that failure to have a valid listing agreement 
outstanding with the seller upon the property’s sale entitles the agent to a 
commission.
34
 
III. PROCURING CAUSE: A QUESTION OF FACT FOR THE JURY 
Let us back up a moment to the court’s statement in Kuga that a broker 
or agent must produce a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy the 
property on the owner’s terms, regardless of whether the sale is ultimately 
consummated.
35
 What does the court mean by “produce?”
36
 Essentially, 
the court means that the broker or agent must be the “procuring cause” of 
the sale, but with one caveat.
37
 The Supreme Court of Virginia has sug-
gested that it is impossible to satisfy the requirements of “procuring 
cause” without first producing a ready, willing, and able buyer.
38
 The 
production of a “ready, willing, and able” purchaser is the foundation 
upon which the attempt to prove “procuring cause” will be built. At this 
point, it is helpful to consult the “procuring cause” jury instruction. In a 
“procuring cause” controversy, the standard the facts must meet in order to 
                                                 
31 See, e.g., Richeson, 47 S.E.2d at 397 (“[T]he payment of the commission was stipu-
lated to be conditioned upon the consummation of the particular sale, at the particular 
price and within a specified time.”); Long v. Flory & Garber, 72 S.E. 723, 723–24 (Va. 
1911) (“[T]he right of the plaintiffs[’] [brokers] to demand commissions was predicated 
upon the consummation by them of a sale at the price named.”) (emphasis added) (deny-
ing plaintiff’s commission when property sold for less than the amount required under the 
broker-seller arrangement). 
32 See supra notes 17–18. 
33 See Richeson, 47 S.E.2d at 396; Massie, 114 S.E. at 653; Low Moor Iron Co., 84 
S.E. at 102–03; infra notes 35–39. 
34 See supra notes 16–18; infra text accompanying notes 125–29. 
35 Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 818 (Va. 1991). 
36 Id. at 819. 
37 Edmonds v. Coldwell Banker, 377 S.E.2d 443, 445–46 (Va. 1989). 
38 See id. at 445. Edmonds reversed the trial court, which found that the brokerage 
“had not produced a purchaser ready, willing, and able to buy on the [sellers’] terms 
during the listing period,” but that the brokerage “could recover its commission because it 
was the procuring cause of the sale.” Id. (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the court 
asserted that the brokerage could not be the “procuring cause” where it did not “arrange[] 
the terms which produced a purchaser ‘ready, willing, and able to buy.’” Id. at 446. 
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establish or refute liability against the seller is articulated in Virginia 
Model Jury Instruction No. 43.020, which provides as follows: 
To earn his commission a broker must have been the predominant, pro-
curing cause of the sale. This means that he must have been responsible 
for causing a series of events which, without a break in their continuity, 
resulted in completing a sale. If the services of a broker are the predo-
minant procuring cause of the sale, then he is entitled to his commis-
sion even if the seller completes the sale directly with the buyer.39 
The supporting cases for the model jury instruction include Shalimar 
Development, Inc. v. FDIC,
40
 which cited a dispositive break in the conti-
nuity of offering properties for sale to the prospective purchaser, and cases 
such as Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss,
41
 and Arents v. Casselman & 
Co.,
42
 in which the court recognized both the many variables that arise in 
brokerage commission cases, and the need for ultimate disposition by the 
fact-finder. 
Shalimar is the most recent “procuring cause” case that the Supreme 
Court of Virginia has adjudicated.
43
 Unlike the earlier case of Kuga, the 
                                                 
39 JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, No. 43.020; see also Realty Co. of Va., Inc. v. 
Burcum, 106 S.E. 375, 378 (Va. 1921) (“Unless Denton’s acts were the ‘procuring cause’ 
of the ultimate sale then Burcum had the right to sell to Mr. Dick ‘without any compensa-
tion to the Realty Company.’”). In Burcum, a husband and wife solicited the Realty 
Company in 1917 to show them farms available for sale. Id. at 375. In traveling past one 
farm, the Company manager indicated that it was listed for sale with him, but the couple 
indicated that it was late and they declined to visit it, preferring to continue on to the 
other farm they and the Company Manager had initially agreed to visit. Id. The couple 
visited that farm but made no commitment to purchase it. Id. The next day they expressed 
to their host over breakfast that they were in the market for a farm. Id. at 377. The host 
indicated that the Burcum farm (the farm they had declined to view the day before) was 
on the market and the son-in-law of the owner of the farm, who was also at the breakfast 
table, offered to take them to view it. Id. In February of 1918 the couple purchased the 
Burcum farm. Burcum, 106 S.E. at 378. The Realty Company subsequently brought suit 
against the seller to recover a commission on the sale. Id. at 376. The jury declined to 
find the Company manager’s comments to the couple to constitute the “procuring cause” 
of sale and the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed. Id. at 378; see also Wilson v. 
Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 S.E.2d 737, 740 (Va. 1945) (“[T]he expression ‘procuring 
cause’ refers to the cause originating a series of events, which, without break in their 
continuity, result in the accomplishment of the prime object of the employment of the 
broker, which is the procurement of a purchaser ready, willing and able to buy the real 
estate on the owner’s terms.”). 
40 Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 515 S.E.2d 120, 122 (Va. 1999). 
41 Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 221–22 (Va. 1912). 
42 Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910). 
43 Shalimar Dev., Inc., 515 S.E.2d at 124. 
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principal issue in Shalimar was not the extent of the broker’s performance, 
but whether there was adequate continuity between the agent’s actions and 
the ultimate sale of the property.
44
 In Shalimar, the seller terminated the 
brokerage agreement, and all of the seller’s assets transferred to a new 
owner.
45
 The new owner then sold at a substantially reduced price.
46
 Un-
der these circumstances, the court decided that there had been a clean and 
distant break; consequently, the broker was not due a commission.
47
 
As the cases of Shalimar, Paschall & Gresham, Arents, and also Ford 
v. Gibson and Clarke v. Cosby, discussed infra, indicate: “Whether a bro-
ker is the procuring cause of a sale of property listed with him is usually a 
question of fact” for the jury.
48
 
IV. THE DEFENSE OF ABANDONMENT: ALSO A QUESTION FOR THE JURY 
Defendants frequently raise the defense of abandonment when sued by 
agents demanding commissions.
49
 In such cases, defendants argue that the 
agent abandoned his or her obligation to market the properties, and thus is 
not entitled to a commission.
50
 As acknowledged infra, the cases of Ford 
v. Gibson
51
 and Clarke v. Cosby
52
 evidence that a seller who abandons his 
efforts to sell property is not entitled to a commission. But that is not the 
only point of law to be taken from this pair of cases. They each also make 
clear that whether an agent abandons his attempts to secure a sale is a 
                                                 
44 Id. 
45 Id. at 122. 
46 Id. 
47 Cf. Clarke v. Cosby, 153 S.E. 727, 728–29 (Va. 1930) (stating misunderstandings 
between the parties caused an end to the relationship before plaintiff had a contract with 
the buyer). 
48 Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Va. 1950) (“Whether a broker is the procuring 
cause of a sale of property listed with him is usually a question of fact.”) (citing Rosen-
field v. Wall, 109 A. 409, 410 (Conn. 1920)); Wilson v. Schmidt & Wilson, Inc., 35 
S.E.2d 737, 739 (Va. 1945) (“Whether a broker is the procuring cause of a sale of proper-
ty listed with him is usually a question of fact.”); Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730 (“When a real 
estate broker is the procuring cause of the sale is a question of considerable difficulty; in 
the main, it is a question of fact.”); Shea Realty Corp. v. Page, 69 S.E. 327, 328 (Va. 
1910) (“[W]hether or not the agent or broker was the procuring cause of the sale is a 
question for the jury.”). 
49 See Blankenship v. Childress, 31 S.E.2d 302, 303 (Va. 1944). 
50 Id. at 305. 
51 Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 870. 
52 Clarke, 153 S.E. at 731. 
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question of fact to be determined by the fact-finder, and not for determina-
tion by the court on demurrer or summary judgment.
53
 
In Ford, a broker brought a potential buyer to view the seller’s farm, 
but no purchase was consummated.
54
 After the twelve-month listing 
agreement had expired by its terms, the same potential buyer inquired 
eight months later, without revealing that he had previously seen the farm 
with the agent, and asked the seller “whether the property was still in the 
real estate agents’ hands and [the seller] said it was not.”
55
 The seller then 
sold to the buyer.
56
 When the broker sued to recover a commission, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the jury’s conclusion that no listing 
agreement was in force requiring a commission to be paid, affirming that, 
“on the evidence the jury had a right to find that the plaintiffs were not the 
procuring cause of the sale,” and that the agent was not entitled to a com-
mission.
57
 
Like Ford, Clarke involved a broker who unsuccessfully brought suit 
against a party for a real estate commission.
58
 In Clarke, two real estate 
brokers, Cosby and Stratton, brought suit against Clarke, a real estate 
auctioneer, for commissions allegedly owed.
59
 The parties had an ar-
rangement whereby Clarke would pay Cosby and Stratton two percent 
commission on all business solicited and secured.
60
 In an attempt to secure 
commissions, the brokers-plaintiffs approached Davie, the owner of a tract 
of land, and attempted to persuade him to attend one of Clarke’s sales so 
that he could become familiar with him.
61
 At the time, Davie was not 
interested.
62
 “About two months after this visit,” however, Davie ap-
proached an agent of Clarke with a request to examine his property, which 
he did.
63
 Davie testified that he had seen Clarke’s advertisements before 
the visit by Cosby and Stratton and had seen the advertisements since.
64
 
                                                 
53 See Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 870 (“Whether a broker is the procuring cause of a sale of 
property listed with him is usually a question of fact.”); Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730 (“When a 
real estate broker is the procuring cause of the sale is a question of considerable difficul-
ty; in the main, it is a question of fact.”). 
54 See Ford, 59 S.E.2d at 868. 
55 Id. at 869. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 870. 
58 See Clarke, 153 S.E. at 728. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. 
64 Clarke, 153 S.E. at 728. 
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Shortly thereafter, Cosby and Stratton had a number of disputes with 
Clarke regarding commissions for properties they believed they had se-
cured for Clarke.
65
 “As the result of these misunderstandings, the relations 
of the plaintiffs and the defendant were severed before the plaintiffs had 
secured any contract with Davie.”
66
 
Not surprisingly, the court concluded that, “the plaintiffs had severed 
their connection with Clarke before the Davie contract was entered into 
and had previously discontinued all their efforts to secure such a contract 
with Davie. Under such circumstances, without more, there [could] be no 
recovery of commission.”
67
 The court thus reversed the jury’s verdict that 
a commission was owed to the plaintiffs.
68
 Here, because “the relations 
between the plaintiffs and the defendants had been terminated before the 
[sales] contract was made ... and had ceased their efforts to procure it 
before it was made,”
69
 the court decided that “there [could] be no recovery 
of commission.”
70
 Although the court concluded that it “was not a case 
which should have been submitted to a jury in order to determine whether 
or not the plaintiffs were entitled to commissions,”
71
 had the parties’ rela-
tionship not terminated, the issue of “procuring cause” would have gone to 
the jury. 
In Clarke, as in Ford, a jury was permitted to make the determination 
of whether the facts gave rise to circumstances causing a commission to be 
due.
72
 Unlike Ford, however, though the jury in Clarke concluded the 
plaintiffs were entitled to a commission, the Supreme Court of Virginia 
disagreed, finding that the case should not have gone to a jury because the 
broker’s relationship with the firm had terminated.
73
 Notwithstanding the 
disposition, the Clarke case may still be helpful to agents seeking to re-
cover commissions. Of note is its statement that, “a broker may be found 
to have been the procuring cause of the sale where the only act done by 
him was to show the property to the purchaser, or even to call attention to 
it, the sale being completed by the owner.”
74
 
                                                 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 729. 
68 Id. at 731. 
69 Id. (emphasis added). 
70 Clarke, 153 S.E. at 729. 
71 Id. at 731. 
72 Id. at 728. 
73 Id. at 731; Ford v. Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 870 (Va. 1950). 
74 Clarke, 153 S.E. at 730. 
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V. “BAD FAITH” OF SELLERS: AN AID TO “PROCURING CAUSE” AND 
ALSO A JURY QUESTION 
Just as “a broker must do more than be the procuring cause of sale 
with a ready, willing and able buyer”
75
 by acting in good faith with respect 
to his dealings, a seller is likewise obligated to act in good faith in his 
dealings with brokers.
76
 The question of whether acts were conducted in 
good faith, like the question of “procuring cause” and the question of 
abandonment, is an issue of fact for the jury to decide.
77
 As Clarke, dis-
cussed supra, demonstrates, an agent can recover a commission “in cases 
in which there has been a severance of relations by fault of the principal in 
bad faith and for the very purpose of avoiding the payment of commis-
sions to a broker who has faithfully served him.”
78
 Yet Clarke, decided in 
1930, was not the first case in Virginia to say as much.
79
 Earlier, in the 
1912 case of Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, the agent introduced the 
seller to a purchaser, but the seller undertook to complete the sale himself 
without paying a commission.
80
 In allowing the agent a commission, the 
Supreme Court of Virginia expressed in no uncertain terms the injustice 
that results when a seller, without paying a commission, negotiates a sale 
with a buyer procured by the agent.
81
 
                                                 
75 JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra note 20, Civil Scope Note. 
76 Id. at No. 43.060. 
77 See Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 224 (Va. 1912) (“The question as 
to bad faith on the part of the plaintiff, urged by the defendants, was one of fact, fairly to 
be submitted to the jury.”). 
78 Clarke, 153 S.E. at 729. 
79 See, e.g., Paschall, 75 S.E. at 220. 
80 Id. at 224. 
81 Id. at 226 (“‘If vendors were permitted ... to employ brokers to look up purchasers, 
and call the attention of buyers to property which they desired to sell, limiting them as to 
terms of sale, and then, when such purchasers were negotiating, take the matter in their 
own hands, avail themselves of the labor, services, and expenses of the broker in bringing 
the property into market, and accomplish a sale by an abatement in the price, and yet 
refuse to pay the broker anything, the business of a broker would not be worth pursuing. 
Gross injustice would be done. Every unfair and illiberal vendor would limit his property 
at a price slightly above the market, and make use of the broker to bring it into notice, 
and then make his own terms with the buyers, who were in reality procured by the efforts 
of the agent.’”) (quoting Keys v. Johnson, 68 Pa. 42, 44 (1871)); see also Foltz v. Conrad 
Realty Co., 109 S.E. 463, 467 (1921) (“[I]f a broker performs his part of a contract em-
powering him to sell the lands of a principal, and does all that he is required to do, and 
the sale is not consummated by reason of the default of the principal, the broker is en-
titled to his commissions, as the principal cannot wrongfully interfere with the broker, 
and escape liability.”); Robertson’s Ex’r v. Atl. Coast Realty Co., 106 S.E. 521, 529 
(1921) (“A principal cannot, after having made a valid contract with an agent for the 
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Likewise, in Arents v. Casselman & Co.,
82
 the court found that where a 
brokerage agreement was revoked due to the withdrawal of a firm mem-
ber, and the remaining firm members nevertheless maintained sales efforts 
after repeated urging from the seller to market the property, the question 
was one for the jury; to wit: had the original contract been renewed or 
continued, and, if so, was the seller liable in quantum meruit for the efforts 
provided.
83
 
The seller, of course, is by no means the only one with a duty to act in 
good faith. The cases of Owen v. Shelton,
84
 Duncan v. Barbour,
85
 and 
Mitchell v. Hughes
86
 offer three instances in which brokers were denied 
commissions for having engaged in actions that amounted to “bad faith.” 
Owen v. Shelton deemed the failure of the agent to inform the seller of a 
material letter threatening a lawsuit to constitute a breach of fiduciary 
duty.
87
 In Duncan v. Barbour, the broker represented to the seller that 
changes were made to a contract rejected by the seller, when in fact most 
of the revised contract remained unchanged.
88
 Mitchell v. Hughes dealt 
with an agent who sought a commission after sending the purchaser to 
negotiate with the seller without disclosing his representation of the buy-
er.
89
 The details of these cases, as follow, are revealing. 
In Owen v. Shelton,
90
 a broker employed by the seller received a letter 
and check from the buyer indicating that payment for interest, here as the 
result of delay by the buyers, was being paid “under protest to close the 
transaction,” and that the buyers “reserve[d] right to demand refund or to 
litigate the matter.”
91
 The broker failed to disclose this information to the 
seller he represented, and after the seller was sued, she in turn sued the 
broker.
92
 The court held that the broker’s failure to inform the seller of this 
letter constituted breach of fiduciary duty.
93
 
                                                                                                                         
exclusive right to sell, render performance on the part of the agent impossible by making 
the sale himself, and then successfully defend an action for breach of the contract by 
claiming that the agent might not have made the sale.”). 
82 Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910). 
83 Id. 
84 Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981). 
85 Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 265 (Va. 1948). 
86 Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 228–29 (Va. 1925). 
87 Owen, 277 S.E.2d at 192. 
88 Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 265. 
89 Mitchell, 130 S.E. at 228–29. 
90 Owen, 227 S.E.2d at 192. 
91 Id. at 191. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 192. 
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In Duncan v. Barbour,
94
 the broker obtained for his seller a contract 
that the seller rejected for failing to meet specific demands.
95
 In response, 
the broker prepared a new contract that changed one item to comport with 
the seller’s specific demands, but remained otherwise unchanged.
96
 The 
seller “read the contract hastily,” and was “under the impression that the 
broker was getting information to prepare a contract in accordance with 
the terms and conditions he had prescribed and had specifically and re-
peatedly told the broker he desired.”
97
 The owner testified that he thought 
that the second contract contained his specific demands and would be 
signed by the buyers.
98
 Shortly thereafter, following a conversation with 
his wife, the seller concluded he did not want to sell the property, phoned 
the broker “and revoked the authority of the broker to proceed with the 
negotiation of the sale, and told him not to make any other efforts ....”
99
 
Over the next few days the broker unsuccessfully tried to persuade the 
owner to change his mind, and at one point “took from his pocket a check 
and the second contract which had been signed by [the potential purchas-
ers.]”
100
 The seller said that ship had sailed, though negotiations continued 
between the seller and broker for about a week.
101
 When it became appar-
ent, however, that the parties would not reach an agreement, the broker 
demanded a commission, which the seller refused to pay, and suit fol-
lowed.
102
 
The Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial court’s denial of the 
broker’s claim to a commission for two reasons. First, the court concluded 
that, under the employment contract between the seller and broker, the 
broker was required to procure a written contract in order to obtain a 
commission.
103
 While this point was disputed at trial, the trial court con-
cluded that, on the facts, the language of the parties’ agreement required 
the broker to produce a written contract.
104
 Notably, the court recognized 
that under some “contract[s] of employment, the broker is not required to 
procure a written contract signed by the purchaser as a condition precedent 
to his right to recover commissions; nor does his right to compensation 
                                                 
94 Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 264 (Va. 1948). 
95 Id. 
96 Id. at 265. 
97 Id. at 262. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 Id. 
104 Id. 
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depend upon the consummation of sale.”
105
 Whether the same circums-
tances would ring true in the case at bar, said the court, was a question for 
the jury to decide.
106
 However, though the plaintiff had the opportunity to 
present his case before a jury, he elected in this instance to have the case 
adjudicated by the court.
107
 Secondly, the court denied the broker a com-
mission because he breached his duty of good faith by failing to “disclose 
to his principal the vital differences in the terms and conditions of sale 
contemplated by the parties.”
108
 The court concluded that: 
This duty was not discharged by simply handing to the owner an un-
signed contract and directing his attention to one specific change. It 
was his duty to inform his principal of all facts which might influence 
his principal in accepting or rejecting the offer. An agent is not entitled 
to recover until he has fully performed this duty to his principal.109 
Somewhat similarly to Duncan, Mitchell v. Hughes
110
 concerned an 
appeal from a jury verdict awarding a broker a commission that the court 
had set aside.
111
 Mitchell was a broker retained by Hughes to sell a parcel 
of land.
112
 Although Mitchell was unable to find a buyer at Hughes’s de-
sired price, he located a potential purchaser and instructed the purchaser to 
contact Hughes without mentioning his involvement.
113
 After Hughes sold 
the property to the purchaser for less than he had sought to obtain from a 
sale with the broker’s involvement, Mitchell re-initiated contact with 
Hughes, informing him for the first time that he had directed the purchase 
to Hughes and was thus seeking a commission.
114
 Not surprisingly, 
Hughes objected, indicating that he would not have sold the land for the 
lower price he received had he known an agent and a commission were 
involved.
115
 Upon hearing the case, the Supreme Court of Virginia con-
cluded that the jury had disregarded one of the jury instructions, and there-
                                                 
105 Id. 
106 Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 261. 
107 Id. 
108 Id. at 265. 
109 Id. 
110 Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 227 (Va. 1925). 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 226. 
113 Id. at 226–27. 
114 Id. at 227. 
115 Id. In a telegraph message, Hughes wrote: “Do not understand Mitchell’s position 
in this deal, as option and contract was made direct with you [buyer] and price based on 
the understanding that no commission was to be paid.” Id. 
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fore affirmed the trial judge’s action.
116
 Thus, in Mitchell, the broker acted 
in bad faith by deceiving the seller into thinking that no broker was in-
volved, and then springing from the shadows after closing to inform the 
seller that he had sent the purchaser and was thereby due a commission.
117
 
More recently—and on the extreme end of cases not suitable for pres-
entation to a jury—the City of Roanoke Circuit Court, in Gorman, Inc. v. 
Trans-World Enterprises,
118
 granted summary judgment against a broker 
who first “admitted that [he] never told defendant” of efforts to sell the 
property after the listing agreement expired,
119
 and second, “testified to a 
belief that, if a real estate broker ever had supplied information necessary 
to consummate a sale of real estate, then the broker would receive a com-
mission regardless of when the sale took place.”
120
 When asked “why, if 
that be the case, one would include a provision granting a broker a com-
mission for sales consummated within a specific period after the contract’s 
termination date ... [his answer was] ‘I don’t know.’”
121
 
Keeping in mind that in all colorable cases “[t]he question as to bad 
faith on the part of the plaintiff [is] one of fact, fairly to be submitted to 
the jury,”
122
 it is worth noting that in the three afore-discussed cases of 
Owen v. Shelton,
123
 Duncan v. Barbour,
124
 and Mitchell v. Hughes,
125
 the 
question of bad faith was, indeed, reserved for decision by the fact-finder. 
OBSERVATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
This short work has touched on some of the most frequently cited 
“procuring cause” cases to have been adjudicated by the Supreme Court of 
Virginia. Yet it must be remembered that each case concerns a unique set 
of facts unlikely to ever be repeated. Consequently, the law in this area is 
highly fact-sensitive. It is possible, however, to draw some general obser-
vations and conclusions. Perhaps the clearest instruction from the cases is 
that an agent is least likely to recover when the agent fails to have a valid 
listing agreement outstanding with the seller at the time the property is 
sold, or when there is inadequate continuity between the agent’s actions 
                                                 
116 Mitchell, 130 S.E. 227, 229. 
117 Id. at 228–29. 
118 Gorman, Inc. v. Trans-World Enters., 28 Va. Cir. 517, 517 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992). 
119 Id. 
120 Id. at 519. 
121 Id. 
122 Paschall & Gresham v. Gilliss, 75 S.E. 220, 224 (Va. 1912). 
123 Owen v. Shelton, 277 S.E.2d 189, 192 (Va. 1981). 
124 Duncan v. Barbour, 49 S.E.2d 260, 265 (Va. 1948). 
125 Mitchell v. Hughes, 130 S.E. 225, 227 (Va. 1925). 
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and the ultimate sale of the property; indeed, these two situations are often 
six to one, half-a-dozen to another.
126
 Though it is true that an agent’s 
failure to proffer a valid listing agreement to the court may not always 
preclude recovery on a quantum meruit basis,
127
 this would nevertheless 
surely result in an uphill battle.
128
 Ultimately, therefore, though by law an 
agent need only procure a “ready, willing and able buyer,” it can be signif-
icantly more difficult to prove this assertion than it is to make it.
129
 
As is always the case in commercial transactions, the preferred course 
for parties seeking to collect on or defend against a suit for a commission 
is to secure legal counsel immediately.
130
 If litigation should ensue, parties 
will be in a better position to have their interests protected if notes of all 
conversations and interactions with the relevant parties are documented by 
hand with the dates of the events in question denoted.
131
 Further, all rele-
                                                 
126 See, e.g., Shalimar Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 515 S.E.2d 120, 124 (Va. 1999); Ford v. 
Gibson, 59 S.E.2d 867, 869 (Va. 1950); Clarke v. Cosby, 153 S.E. 727, 729 (Va. 1930); 
Gorman, Inc. v. Trans-World Enters., 28 Va. Cir. 517, 517 (Va. Cir. Ct. 1992) (all cases 
where listing agreements had expired, there were questions as to adequate continuity, and 
where the court denied commissions). 
127 See Arents v. Casselman & Co., 66 S.E. 820, 821 (Va. 1910) (permitting recovery 
on a quantum meruit basis); supra note 19. Moreover, where the seller exercised bad faith 
and circumvented his realtor to sell property to a person introduced by a realtor, the 
Virginia Supreme Court similarly recognized that recovery may occur alternately upon an 
express contract or on an implied contract, quantum meruit basis. See Clarke, 153 S.E. at 
729 (“Of course we do not mean to say that there can be no recovery in cases in which 
there has been a severance of relations by fault of the principal in bad faith and for the 
very purpose of avoiding the payment of commissions to a broker who has faithfully 
served him.”); Paschall, 75 S.E. at 224; see also Hawthorne v. Hannowell, 115 S.E.2d 
889, 893–94 (Va. 1960); Bear v. Parrish, 139 S.E. 488, 489–90 (Va. 1927); Palmer v. 
Showalter, 101 S.E. 136, 139–40 (Va. 1919) (offering instances in which sellers acted in 
“bad faith,” resulting in awards of commissions to brokers). 
128 In Virginia, the statute of limitations on a written agreement or written contract is 
five years. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-246(2) (West 2011). This means that any potential suit 
for alleged breach must be filed within five years from the date of the action alleged to 
constitute the breach of written agreement or breach of written contract. 
129 See, e.g., Kuga v. Chang, 399 S.E.2d 816, 819 (Va. 1991) (stating the “ready, will-
ing, and able” standard); Duncan, 49 S.E.2d at 263 (same); JURY INSTRUCTIONS, supra 
note 20, No. 43.050 (“A purchaser is ready, willing and able to buy if he wants to buy 
and if at the time he is produced to the seller he has the ability to obtain any necessary 
financing at the closing”). 
130 See, e.g., Do You Really Need a Lawyer?, LAWYERS.COM, http://research.lawyers 
.com/Do-You-Really-Need-a-Lawyer.html (last visited Jan. 20, 2012). 
131 See, e.g., David J. Freedman, Okay, You Think You Might Be Sued. Now What? 
Litigation Holds and the World of Electronic Discovery, BARLEY SNYDER BUS. & LITIG. 
UPDATE, (June 30, 2008), at 2, http://www.barley.com/publications/article.cfm?Article 
_ID=262. 
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vant e-mails should be printed, and all documents, letters, and correspon-
dence exchanged in connection with the transaction should be organized, 
kept clean, and preserved in a safe environment.
132
 If these practices are 
followed, parties will be in a position of strength to marshal the facts and 
frame their argument in the light most favorable to them in the event that 
litigation ultimately ensues. 
                                                 
132 See, e.g., id. 
